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00O00 
Respondent accepts the statement of Issues Presented 
by the Appellants1 Petition and hereafter responds to them. 
Respondent has raised the issue as to whether the 
Court's decision to overturn the Lower Court's ruling as to 
Sheets 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions is 
correct. Respondent submits as stated hereafter that the con-
clusion of the Trial Court is otherwise correct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent accepts Appellants' Statement for the 
purpose of this proceeding. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rather than challenge or alter the Statement of Facts 
set forth by Appellants,' Respondent has elected to refer to 
pertinent facts as part of its argument. It is true as alleged 
by Appellants that the Court in a few instances has misstated 
factual matters. Any misstatements of facts in the Court's 
Opinion which are considered material are covered in argument 
herein. There is a comprehensive Statement of Facts in 
Respondent's Brief covering 21 pages. This is reproduced and 
included in an appendix to this Brief for reference. Any factual 
representations made in this Brief are believed to be covered in 
said Statement of Facts, including citations to the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In holding that UDOT's Plans and Specifications 
affirmatively misrepresented site conditions, this Court's 
April 1 Opinion is in error. The Court violates its own oft-
repealed rule that it will not disturb factual determinations if 
there is evidence in the record to support the ruling of the 
Lower Court. [Thorn Construction Co. v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 
1979) being one such case.] Points cited by this Court in 
support of its ruling as to the misleading character of Sheet 2B 
of the Plans and Sheet 44 of the Special Provisions were all 
argued by counsel and fully considered by the Trial Court. There 
is substantial credible evidence to support the rulings of the 
Lower Court. The Court in its opinion recognizes the obligation 
of Appellant to conduct a reasonable, prudent site visit. This 
same standard should apply to Appellants' review of the Plans and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Specifications. The best that can be said in Appellants1 behalf 
is that the Plans and Specifications are incomplete. This 
imposes a duty of inquiry on Appellants consistent with industry 
practice. Other bidders on the project were aware of local 
common knowledge or had firsthand experience in the area. 
Appellants would now have this Court penalize these contractors 
for this greater knowledge and experience which resulted in their 
higher bid prices due to anticipated problems which Appellants 
failed to perceive. The reliance of the Appellants on Thorn is 
misplaced. Verbal representations in this case are exactly 
contrary to those in Thorn. The Project Engineer assigned to the 
subject project and the Project Engineer on an earlier project 
both stated that Appellants were cautioned by them that gradation 
compliance had been a problem for earlier contractors. 
Appellants ignored these verbal warnings, whereas in Thorn the 
contractor was permitted to rely on an oblique verbal statement 
by a low-level employee that the material "could be used". The 
legal principles in Thorn do not apply otherwise in this case. 
The Court's Opinion should be modified to make it 
consistent with the Trial Court's decision. The Trial Court was 
better placed to decide whether the Plans and Specifications were 
"misleading" in the context of the evidence. This determination 
requires a comprehensive understanding of the facts which the 
Trial Court possessed. 
Respondent has not breached the contract. It provided 
written information which is factually correct. Information 
supplied describes two materials sources both used successfully 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by other contractors along with selected data concerning the 
sites. The failure of the contractor to produce a satisfactory 
product was related to contract performance and lack of care, and 
not to information supplied by Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED ON SHEET 2B OF THE 
PLANS AND SHEET 44 OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
IS NOT MISLEADING TO A COMPETENT CONTRACTOR 
The law i s c l e a r t h a t i n o rder for a c o n t r a c t o r t o 
p r e v a i l on a t heo ry of m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n he must in essence prove 
two t h i n g s : (1) t h a t he was " a c t i n g reasonab ly and was mis led by 
i n c o r r e c t p l a n s and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s " as t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court s a i d 
in Souza & McCue Construction Cot v, Superior Court, 57 cal.2d 
508, 370 P.2d 338 (1962), to which t h i s Court has in Thorn Con-
s t ruc t ion Co, v, UDOTr supra, added t h a t a pre-bid verbal repre-
sen ta t ion can also be construed t o mislead a cont rac tor , and (2) 
tha t he has v i s i t e d the s i t e of the work and made a reasonable 
inspect ion and i s accountable for anything which i s obvious from 
such s i t e v i s i t . (Mojave Enterpr i ses v. U.S . , 3 CI. Ct. 353, 
The dispute in t h i s case, unlike Thsxja, involves 
pr imari ly the adequacy of wr i t t en information. Verbal informa-
t i on was r e l a t e d by UDOT's Engineer Mecham to Parson 's agent 
Wilson of poss ible gradation problems. Wilson denied the 
warning, but the Tr ia l Court apparently placed some re l iance on 
Mecham1s vers ion of the telephone conversat ion. The conversation 
i s exact ly opposite to Thorn in t h a t i t warns of a possible 
problem. There was an e a r l i e r verbal warning to Wilson about the 
limestone p i t s on the San Rafael by Eldred Swapp, a r e t i r e d UDOT 
- 4 -
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Project Engineer, whose testimony went unrefuted at trial and 
which also put Appellants on some duty of inquiry. 
The fact that the tests in Pit 2 found on Sheet 2B of 
the Plans were mostly taken in 1969 in a location previously 
excavated apparently troubles the Court. Aerial photographs in 
evidence taken prior to construction in or around Pit 2 show an 
exposed rock mass. (It is within the right-of-way of the now 
existing 1-70 freeway.) The 1969 tests were taken several 
hundred feet south of existing 1-70 at points in this rock 
formation. The one subsequent test described on Sheet 2B was of 
the same rock mass north of the 1-70 roadway but still within the 
right-of-way limit. The later test confirmed the 1969 tests, and 
they were included for information purposes. In a properly 
conducted site visit a competent contractor should recognize that 
the material where the 1969 tests were conducted had been 
removed. Later tests which the Court makes reference to as 
indicating that the material "might be marginal" were taken in a 
location west of the existing pit and would represent another 
"layer in the cake" which is apparent in photographs and 
testimony which was before the Trial Court. 
Indications of potential problems in crushing required 
materials are evident in the test results. One contractor stated 
that he anticipated "easy crushing" because the L.A. Rattler test 
results indicate soft material. Test results with a range of 
hardness between 30 and 39% should alert a contractor to expect 
to produce an excess of fine-sized materials. The pits were 
"limestone ledge rock" as contrasted with a typical alluvial 
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deposit and required blasting to remove material. Appellants1 
blasting left much harder, better rock in fragments too large for 
its crushing system which further reduced the quality of material 
produced. "Overburden" was an obvious problem not recognized by 
Appellants. 
The pit evaluation report for an earlier Project which 
recommended that Pit 2 not be used for future road projects was 
fully explained by Eldred Swapp, the Engineer, who stated he knew 
of no available material any better than the two sources on Sheet 
2B. 
The State had substantial information covering two 
earlier projects and a foundational geological study in two large 
bound volumes. The question isnft that the State was "selective" 
in what it chose to display on Sheet 2B, as the Court notes, 
obviously it was. The question rather is, did the information on 
Sheet 2B accurately reflects the material in the pit? The 
conclusion of the contractors who testified, Eldred Swapp and 
Jerry Mecham, the UDOT Engineers who worked on Pit 2 projects, a 
Geologist employed by the Utah Geological & Mineral Survey, and 
materials engineers for UDOT, was in the affirmative. 
Given the expressed attitude of the contractor as to 
the capability of its equipment to produce the desired product at 
the time it bid the project and the failure of Wilson and 
McDonald to recognize difficulties evident to other contractors 
and their own more experienced company personnel, it is highly 
questionable whether Appellants would have altered their bid had 
they seen and examined all available UDOT data concerning Pit 2. 
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The Court's Opinion discusses the misrepresentations 
concerning the "two designated prospects" and refers to the 
"suitability of the borrow" in the prospects. (To set the record 
straight only Prospect 2 is at issue. There was no evidence 
concerning Prospect 1 being anything other than as represented.) 
Prospects 1 and 2 are not "borrow pits". A "borrow pit" is a 
generic source of highway embankment or fill material, all of 
which is usable. Rather, Pit 2 is an "aggregate source" 
containing materials which had been tested and passed for use in 
the production of crushed rock to be later incorporated into a 
bituminous mixture. The source is "acceptable in general", a 
term commonly used in the construction industry, since not all 
materials in the pit can be used to produce "aggregate". 
Respondent reiterates that its representations on 
Sheets 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions are not 
misleading when properly interpreted as is expected from a 
reasonable, competent contractor. 
Pit 1 was always available for use by Appellants, and 
the BLM property north of the right-of-way fence was made 
available to Appellants very early in the project. Evidence 
before the Court indicated Pit 1 to be a better quality source 
than Pit 2, and the BLM property contained the same formation 
successfully used by earlier contractors without the layer of 
"overburden". 
Respondent respectfully submits that Sheet 2B is not 
misleading. It may be incomplete as Don Killmore, the Area 
Engineer for the Federal Highway Administration testified at 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial, in which case Appellant had a duty to inquire further 
and examine records referenced in the Special Provisions. Both 
Wilson and McDonald knew what records are kept, where they are 
kept, and how to obtain them. 
The problem in this case is the contractor's inability 
to perform, not the alleged difficulties in the plans and 
specifications. Appellants are attempting to shift the con-
tractor's responsibility to Respondent. 
This Court has said in the case of Nielsop v. Chin-
Esien Wang, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah, 1980), that "... the evidence and 
all inferences that fairly and reasonably might be drawn there-
from must be viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment 
entered." (Also citing Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381 P.2d 
86 (1963); and Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 
(1961). Legal conclusions by the Trial Court are heavily 
dependent on close issues of fact. 
II-
PARSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY FAILED TO 
PERFORM A COMPETENT PRE-BID SITE 
INVESTIGATION, AND THE COURT'S DECISION 
TO SUSTAIN TEE TRIAL COURT IN THIS REGARD 
I S CORRECT. 
Respondent agrees with Appellants as to their 
allegations in their Point III that the Court has partially based 
its decision on a site visit made following the opening of bids. 
This, however, actually strengthens the Court's decision and the 
fundamental contention made by Respondent that Appellants1 
approach to the project from bid preparation through performance 
lacked competence as explained hereafter. 
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There were two site visits by Appellants prior to the 
commencement of any construction operations. One performed prior 
to bidding by McDonald and Wilson who prepared Appellants1 bid. 
McDonald1s testimony was impeached at trial on whether Appellants 
in fact relied on Sheet 2B of the plans. (His Deposition 
statement was that they did not rely on Sheet 2B, whereas at 
trial his testimony was directly contrary.) Testimony concerning 
the first site visit is therefore questionable and self-serving. 
The first site visit was not accompanied by any UDOT employee, 
unlike other bidders on this project. 
The second site visit occurred after the bid opening 
and was made by Jack Parson Sr., the company founder, and its 
chief materials superintendent. Jerry Mecham, UDOTfs Project 
Engineer, accompanied this second visit which included Prospects 
1 and 2. Mecham was asked if there were any restrictions on the 
depth of removal in Pit 2 since the rock formation which earlier 
contractors had worked in and which was evident on the north and 
east side of Pit 2 was visible under other material on the east 
side of the pit. 
During this second site visit the unrefuted statement 
of Jack Parson Sr. to the materials superintendent was overheard 
by Mr. Mecham. The statement was that, "it looks like Mont has 
bought us another one", and was understood by Mr. Mecham to mean 
that Wilson had mistakenly bid the job. 
The lack of competence with which Appellants conducted 
their first site visit is evident when the following evidence is 
considered, all of which was before the trial judge: 
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1. The warning by Eldred Swapp to Wilson that the 
limestone pits would generate an excess of fine material and had 
required use of a sand filler. 
2. Parson (Wilson and McDonald) was unfamiliar with 
the area of the project and had never worked in that part of the 
State* 
3. Parson never inquired who the contractors were that 
had used the pit on previous 1-70 projects as referred to in 
Sheet 44 of the Special Provisions. (While there is no require-
ment to do this, all the other bidders knew who they were and 
were aware of conditions they encountered.) 
4. No contact was made, even by telephone, with UDOT 
materials personnel prior to bidding. 
5. Parsons elected not to do any drilling or 
excavation prior to bidding. The pit was already open, faces 
showing the material strata visible and the roadway cut 
paralleling the east part of the source could be viewed. No 
competent contractor could ask for better site information. 
This Court has earlier considered a contract requiring 
a site visit which charges a contractor with knowledge of 
conditions apparent from such visit and apparently approved such 
provision in the case of Allen-Howe Specialties v. UtS» Const* 
Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980). 
The reason for requiring a prospective bidder to visit 
the site of the work prior to submitting a bid is to advise a 
bidder as to things which are already obvious. [See Mandel v. 
U.S., 424 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1970)]. A bidder must be held to 
-10-
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the standard of that which a prudent bidder should customarily 
use in making a judgment regarding the quantity, quality, and 
methods of performing the particular work at the particular time 
and place. [See Charles T. Parker v. U.S., 433 F.2d 771 (Ct. CI. 
1970)] . 
There are a number of cases wherein contractors have 
been denied relief either under "changed conditions" provisions 
where contracts have contained them or in cases alleging 
misrepresentations by the owner based on conditions which were 
"unknown", "unusual", or "not recognized" at the time of bidding. 
The common thread running through these cases is that the bidder 
is expected to possess a certain level of knowledge, competence 
and experience and is not allowed to recover from an owner for 
the lack of such. 
Some typical cases are as follows: In the Appeal of 
Call Construction Co., ASBCA 7627, 62 BCA 3590 (1962). Here, the 
board rejected a claim for difficulties caused by seepage at a 
job site in a reclaimed swamp area. The Board reasoned that soil 
and water characteristics were to be expected. In Husman 
Brothers, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-15, 73-1 BCA 1[ 9889 (January 26, 
1973) , the board held that a contractor failed to realize the 
laws of nature and should have known "the type of soils, the 
climate and that 'pumping1 or capillary action of water in that 
type of soils is a common problem." In Leal v. U.S., 276 F.2d 
378 (Ct. CI. 1960) the Court denied a claim and specifically 
noted that other contractors raised questions in the bid process 
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about certain water conditions. The Court felt with such 
evidence, conditions at the site and information provided to the 
bidders, it was reasonable to expect the encountered conditions. 
(The Court specifically found that furnished plan data would 
indicate to an experienced operator the existence of water. Such 
conclusion supports Respondent's contention that UDOT furnished 
data contained no surprises regarding difficulty in producing 
desired gradation of the aggregate to an experienced bidder since 
a high wear test (L.A. Rattler) percentage would indicate a high 
level of waste in fine sized material.) 
Courts have also held that if conditions in the work 
are commonly known, and the contractor fails to inform himself of 
those conditions, he has not established a claim. [Biggers 
Construction Co, Ins,, EBCA No. 46-4-79, 81-1 BCA % 14,848 at 
73,316 (Dec. 19, 1980)] (Soil make-up and compaction diffi-
culties in soils west of Idaho Falls, Idaho, are not unknown or 
unusual and contractor failed to inform itself of these condi-
tions.) Also, Husman Brothers, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-15, 73-1 BCA 
% 9889 (January 26, 1973), holds that the contractor is held to 
what is "common knowledge", and the Court stated as follows: 
We must consider pertinent 
climatological, hydrological and geo-
logical data and all other relevant 
and probative evidence about the 
geographical area involved. The 
contractor is held to a standard of 
knowledge of ordinary usual conditions 
in a particular geographical area. 
Courts and Boards have held that such a contractor is 
chargeable with knowledge of local conditions at the job site 
which is readily obtainable from local contractors on request. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Appeal of Daymar, Inc., DOT CAB 77-13, 78-1 BCA 12903 (1977). 
In this case, a Nebraska contractor was presumed to be aware of 
conditions in Montana that were matters of local common 
knowledge. 
The problem of soft rock and excessive waste in gravel 
pits in Southeastern Utah is common knowledge to contractors and 
residents in that area. The behavior of limestone and its 
tendency to reduce to a fine consistency when handled and 
subjected to crushing is "common knowledge" in the industry 
according to trial testimony. The inherent difficulty in 
handling materials which have been blasted, such as in Pit 2, was 
explained by expert testimony at trial. 
Appellants are responsible for their lack of knowledge 
as to local conditions and the consequences of their aggregate 
production operations. 
III. 
APPELLANTS ELECTED TO DEFAULT THE CONTRACT 
AND ARE LIABLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH 
DECISION 
Appellants argue in their Petition for Rehearing that 
the Court's Opinion is a determination that UDOT breached the 
construction contract. Appellants cite the case of Admiral 
Plastics Corp, v. Trueblood, Inc., 436 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1971) 
as authority for the proposition that where both parties have 
breached the contract, neither party is allowed to recover 
contract damages. The ruling of the Court is actually much 
narrower than Appellants represent. The central issue in the 
case was, who was at fault for ordering a wrong component part 
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for a machine? The Court did not decide who was at fault, but 
found both parties did not act in good faith and that as a result 
there was a mutual rescission of the contract. This case is not 
in point since the good faith of Respondent is obvious in its 
attempts to resolve the dispute between the parties. When 
Respondent could not agree to meet the excessive demands of 
Appellants, the Appellants elected to default the contract. 
Assuming Respondent had in fact breached the contract, Respondent 
could have elected to perform and recover its damages later. By 
electing to default the contract, Appellants assume responsi-
bility for Respondent's increased costs if it cannot prove that 
Respondent materially breached the contract. The law does not 
favor allowing a party to fail to perform a contract, see Green 
v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215 (1946). This Court has 
held in the case of R.C. Tolman Constr. Co. v. Myton Water 
Association, 563 P.2d 780 (Utah, 1977), that deficient plans and 
specifications entitle a contractor to recover extra cost if 
conditions are different than represented or reasonably to be 
anticipated. This does not justify Appellants1 default in 
performance and Respondent should be entitled to recover its 
damages in any event. 
Appellants further argue that their unilateral mistake 
of fact as to the quality of the material in the pits was 
affirmatively caused by Respondent. It was Appellants1 own 
negligence or lack of competence which caused it to be mistaken 
as is glaringly evident in the contrast between the two 
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contractor site visits prior to construction. Material quality 
in the pit was adequate, unfortunately, Appellants lacked the 
ability to perform. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision to sustain the Trial Court is 
correct. Appellants simply did not act reasonably in the conduct 
of its pre-bid site visit or competently in its performance of 
the work. 
Sheet 2B of the Plans and 44 of the Special Provisions 
are not misleading to a reasonable, prudent, and "competent" con-
tractor. "Competent" in this instance means a contractor posses-
sed of "local common knowledge" of the area, of conditions to be 
expected in a limestone pit, and it also means a contractor pos-
sessed of adequate know-how and equipment to produce a product. 
Respondent does not agree that this Court's holding in 
I&iiri} is applicable to this case. To the extent that it may 
apply, the facts would appear to require its use against 
Appellants on the issue of reliance. UDOT's verbal representa-
tions are opposite to that which the Court found in Thorn. 
If the Court elects to change its Opinion of April 1, 
it should be confined to an affirmation of the trial Court's 
Conclusion that the Plans and Specifications do not misrepresent 
site conditions. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney General 
LELANb D./FORD / ^-— 
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APPENDIX 
STATEMENT QF THE NATURE QF THE CASE 
Appellant, Jack B. Parson Construction Co* ("Parson")r 
a general contractor, failed to produce bituminous surface 
course (asphalt) in accordance with contract requirements on 
a project situated on Interstate Highway 70 in Emery County. 
Parson alleged its failure was caused by an inadequate 
materials source and that the Utah Department of Trans-
portation (UDOT) had misrepresented said materials source. 
Parson demanded that UDOT issue a supplemental agreement to 
compensate for its added costs. After a period of nego-
tiations it became clear that no resolution was possible 
due to demands by Parson considered as unreasonable by UDOT. 
UDOT then ordered Parson to proceed to perform the contract 
under threat of default. Parson failed to proceed and UDOT 
declared the contract in default. Parson then sued UDOT 
alleging its faiulre to issue a supplemental agreement was a 
breach of contract and UDOT counterclaimed alleging Parson 
to be in default. UDOT also filed a third party action 
against Parson's surety under its performance and payment 
bonds. Each of the parties sought a determination by the 
lower Court of its legal position and alternatively an award 
of damages. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial to the Court in excess of three weeks 
duration, with numerous witnesses and over 200 exhibits, the 
trial judge found in favor of Respondent and ruled that 
Parson had defaulted the contract and was liable to tJDOT for 
damages. The Court al$o ruled that the Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. ("Aetna"), who had issued payment and performance 
bonds, was, together with Parson, liable to UDOT for its 
damages to be determined in a later hearing. * 
RELIEF SOUGRT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the District Court 
Judgment which it believes to be well founded in both 
factual determinations made by the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
and the legal determinations based thereon. 
^ STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves close questions of construction 
contract law which turn on a careful analysis of specific 
* Note: The Court's Memorandum Decision is dated 
September 11, 1980. Written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Formal Judgment were 
signed and filed of record on March 24, 1981. 
UDOT thereafter relet the construction contract 
to another contractor selected by competitive 
bid on the 7th day of July, 1981. Construction 
was completed in late 1982 and further action by 
UDOT to recover damages awaits the outcome of 
this appeal. 
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facts. Appellant's Statement of Facts contains inac-
curacies, irrelevant'material and requires this supplement 
to make certain that the Court clearly understands the 
strong factual as well as legal basis of the trial Court's 
ruling. 
One key provision often found in construction 
cases is a "differing site conditions" provision which 
f 
determines what happens when actual site conditions 
encountered are other than represented. The contract 
involved herein ("contract") does not contain such a 
provision contrary to Appellant's assumption. Under UDOT 
specifications, a contractor is allowed relief only when 
there is a "change in the plans or in the character of 
construction" which is directed by the engineer. (Ex. 1-P, 
Section 104.02(4), Tr. 1201-1202) No change of this nature 
was recognized by UDOT in this case. 
The contract required the placement of 5" of bitu-
minous surface course (asphalt) with at least 2 1/2" to 
be placed by October 15, 1978. Liquidated damages of 
$300.00 per calendar day are specified for failure to meet 
said date. (Ex. 3-P) 
Prospective bidders are not obligated to use either 
material site on Sheet 2B, and test data shown is also 
subject to a disclaimer provision. (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 106.02) 
-3-
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Prospects 1 and 2 were previously determined to be 
acceptable in accordance with UDOTfs requirements for this 
project and for earlier projects and were used successfully 
by other contractors. (Tr. 1020-1023, Sheet 2Br Ex. 2-P) 
PFE-SIP ACTIVITIES hW BIP 
Contract provisions charge Appellant with knowledge of 
anything apparent from'a site visit. The contractor by 
submitting a bid warrants that he has "satisfied himself of 
actual conditions to be encountered.11 (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 
102.05) UDOT merely stated that the "quality" of materials 
was suitable "in general" and warned that furnished 
information was only "representative" and that "variations" 
should be considered "usual" and are to be "expected." (Ex. 
1-P, Sec. 106.02) A federal engineer familiar with UDOT 
specifications, this contract in particular, and how 
other States provide pre-bid information stated that UDOT's 
information regarding Pit 2 was "fairly minimal." (Tr. 1256, 
1257) He stated that Appellant "should have sought more 
information." (Tr. 1262) The phrase "acceptable in 
general" is not a guarantee and does not require UDOT to 
"bear the risk" of a contractors failure to successfully 
use the described material. (Appellant's "Facts," P. 3) 
Appellant's pre-bid examination of the project was negligent 
and superficial. This was recognized in conversation by its 
-4-
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founder Jack B. Parsonr Sr. while talking to Duane Kern and 
overheard by UDOTfs Engineer Jerry Mecham ("Mecham") prior 
to any work. (Tr. 1290-1292) Appellant's General Manager 
and Vice President John Mont Wilson ("Wilson") did not 
inquire who "previous contractors" were that had used 
Prospects 1 and 2 referred to in UDOT documents, or inquire 
as to previous problems or experience with these pits. (Tr. 
414). Wilson and Appellant's Materials Engineer Dean 
McDonald ("McDonald") visited the construction site prior to 
bidding but did not request that Mecham be present during 
their site visit, a practice often followed. (Tr. 444-445) 
Appellant had never worked in the project area before, (Tr. 
418) and Wilson likewise lacked experience in or knowledge 
of the area. (Tr. 418-419) Wilson had been specifically 
warned of difficulties with Prospects 1 and 2 approximately 
a year earlier by Eldred Swappf a retired UDOT Engineer. 
*** 
Swapp said the pits would require adding a supplementary 
material according to his unrebutted testimony. (Tr. 1467-
1468) Mecham said he informed Wilson by telephone prior to 
bid opening that previous contractors had to blend sandy 
"filler" material into the aggregate to meet specifications. 
(Tr. 1285-1287r 1293) Wilson denied that Mecham so in-
formed him and claimed he first learned of it at the pre-
construction conference. (Tr. 1752-1753) Wilson admitted 
that he registered no objection or protest about this 
-5-
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crucial point at the said conference. (Tr. 1782-1785 & Ex. 
133-D) Both Wilson and McDonald were former DDOT employees, 
knew the type of UDOT records available, where they could be 
obtained, and that the contract invited a bidder to inspect 
them. (Tr. 417 - Wilson and 635-639 - McDonald & Ex. 3-P, 
Spec. Provision, "Bidding Requirements & Conditions, Sec. 
102.05 as changed therein.) Two contractors previously used 
Prospect 2, one used Prospect 1 and their records were 
available in Price and Salt Lake City. Appellant's 
superficial pre-bid investigation is evident in the 
testimony of McDonald. He stated there was "much 
discussion" concerning the test results on Sheet 2B with 
Wilson and what they meant. (Tr. 517) McDonald said he 
tried calling Respondent's District Materials Engineer Al 
Spensko ("Spensko") but failed to reach him. He neither 
identified himself nor requested Spensko to return his 
telephone call. He admitted he knew Spensko would have 
information concerning the pits and area geology. Although 
unfamiliar with the area, he apparently was not seeking 
geologic information. He said he knew that Prospect 2 was 
located in the Moenkopi geologic formation which is well 
known to geologists. (Tr. 634-642) Published geologic data 
of the area described this formation in detail. (Ex. 147-D) 
Available UDOT publications detailed it as well. (Ex. 191-P 
and 192-P) Said publications describe one of the members of 
-6-
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that formation as the "Sinbad limestone." Spensko and Swapp 
who are both graduate geologists confirmed that Pit 2 was 
primarily made up of the "Sinbad limestone." (Tr. 1090f 
1472-1480) Variations in this geologic layer were explained 
by another geologist. (Tr. 1720-1721) McDonald, although a 
geologist, did not discover this available information or 
its implications. 
** 
McDonald claimed at trial that Appellant relied on 
Sheet 2B and the gradations shown thereon. His testimony in 
a prior deposition was, however, directly contrary to this 
and indicated an almost total disregard for this informa-
tion. (Tr. 541, 666-667) Appellant's Statement of Facts 
App. - Facts) claims "heavy reliance" on UDOTfs repre-
* sentation in Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) that Pit 2 was "acceptable 
in general" and then asserts that other contractors also 
relied on such representation. (Tr. 1604) The reference 
to tlie transcript by Appellant is a qualified statement by 
an experienced engineer executive concerning the type of 
tests a contractor relies upon and those which they do not 
rely upon. (See Tr. 1600-1604) Other contractors who 
testified indicated little, if any, reliance on the said 
gradation information. Altogether they show how misplaced 
and incompetent Appellant's claimed reliance on such 
information was. (Tr. 1580-1586; 1632; 1892-1893) Spensko 
explained that UDOT does not make an effort to present 
-7-
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information concerning gradation results which a contractor 
can necessarily correlate to. (Tr. 1529-1531) 
Appellant correctly points out that its bid was less 
than five percent below the next low bidder (Tr. 238), but 
neglects to add that it was approximately 11% under the 
engineerfs estimate, or that the contractor who previously 
used Pit 2 to pave the highway originally was the highest of 
six bidders. Its bid vfas more than $650r000 higher than 
Appellant. (Ex. 6-P) 
Appellant lacked experience with limestone ledge rock 
pits. (Tr. 629-630) Such pits often create excess minus 
200 material; [Minus 200 material is extremely fine grained 
like flour. The material will pass a screen with 200 
openings per lineal inchf hence the reference to "minus 
200."]; limestones vary in grade and in hardness. (Tr. 
1720-1721, 1090) 
Appellant erroneously assumed that neither Pit 1 nor 
Pit 2 contained sufficient material for the entire job 
(P. 7, App. - Facts), but were told before commencing 
operations in Pit 2 that Pit 1 could be expanded to obtain 
all material from said pit. (Exs. 132-D & 133-D, Tr. 470-
471) 
PERFORMANCE BY CONTRACTOR 
A required DDOT test to determine acceptability of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a s p h a ] t a g g i: e g a t € • i £ 11: € • 1 o s I ,, n g e 1 e s W e a r I e s t, :i) r "l!1" 1 I i » • 
Rattler Test," This standardized test measures the ..-.. 
percentage of t>reakdown in an aggregate sample using a 
special machine,. It I s an indicator of 1* now asphalt gravel 
may "wear," UDOT's upper wear limit i s 40%. (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 
4 0 3 .0 3 ) TI: i e I ,, A Ra t 11 e r Te s 1 d o e i 11, o t in i a E U I t c oni p ,11 a i :i, c € 
by a contractor. (Tr. 1592-1593) 
Contract provision's require separation of aggregate 
material into at 1 east two separate piles. All materia, r.as 
had to pass through a 3/4" screen (referred to as ff •» i n c h 
i in i n u s ") W h e i: i t v »' c • p i 3 € s a , i: e u s e d, t h e m a t e r i a ] i I i o i :i e 
aggregate pile must pass through a number 4 screen (4 
openings per 1 i nea] inch) and material in the other pile 
rfi 1 1 b e i etained. (This al lows for variation in the size 
of materia 1 fed into the hot ini x p 1 ant and assists in 
meeting a gradati oi: i s p e c if i c-. * • . • ; "• 
Appellant erroneously asserts Respondent was 
responsible for its "choice c;: c-ushing equipment and its 
arranaement and orcani zati c;. (App. - tacts) Tt ::te 
evidence Appelia-- :; t. \ r . 216-218, 257) is Wilson's 
t e s t e r - -. - ; • - e s s i o n s a n d d esc r i p t :i o n s o f 
photographic c dibits. /:.^ ^ \i nothing therei * 
point r • jf--:,' - b:« e: *.£ vi :-* r.ars' ,\ *.-P) 
i.'f . E ' ^ .... -
selection, usage of equipment, choice •* either pit, 
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direction of removal of material in a pit or a requirement 
to even use either Pit 1 or 2, Appellant can use any source 
it selects, subject only to UDOT's right to test material 
for its suitability. (Sec. 106.02f Ex. 1-P) 
Appellant was late moving its crushing equipment on 
site and in commencing to pave. (Ex. 133-D, Tr. 263) The 
first pavement was placed October 5, 1978. (Tr. 263) 
Contract provisions restrict paving after October 15. (Ex. 
3-P, Sec. 403.11) Appellant sought and received permission 
to extend this deadline under certain conditions. (Exs. 12-
P and 14-P) Appellant failed to meet contract requirements 
both as to gradation of material and asphalt content based 
on random samples of in place material. (Exs. 37-P and 38-
P) Appellant's main difficulty was a deficiency of 
aggregate which would pass a number 16 screen (16 openings 
per inch) and be retained on a 50 screen (50 openings per 
inch) or in an excess of material passing the 200 screen. 
(Exs. 37-P and 38-P) If adjustments were made to reduce the 
minus 200 material it threw the material between the 16 and 
50 screen out and vice versa. (Ex. 37-P and 38-P) This 
resulted in reduced payment for the item under contract 
formula which allows the contractor the option to remove and 
replace the material or to accept payment at a reduced unit 
price if the calculated pay reduction is not more than 30% 
of the full unit price. If the calculated reduction is over 
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30% and less than 50%r the "engineer" has the option to 
order removal of the product or allow it to remain in place. 
(Ex. 3-P, Special Provision Sheets 30-40) 
The average of individual tests of material in stock-
pile indicated a possibility of achieving specification 
gradation requirements* (Ex. 41-P) However large amounts 
of material with high amounts of fine sized material, 
r 
r 
represented by individual samples in both piles, which 
exceeded the overall average could not have been expected to 
combine successfully. (Tr. 455f 1303-1313, Exs. 201-D, 204-
D) Mecham warned Appellant of adverse problems to be 
expected later in recombining the stockpiles due to their 
borderline make-up. (Tr. 1306-1309, 1320, 1321) Wilson 
admitted that Appellant intentionally builds borderline 
stockpiles to maximize production and that this limits the 
capability to recombine the stockpiles and achieve gradation 
specifications. (Tr. 419-422) Appellant's stockpiles were 
not uniform in their make-up. There is over a 9 percentage 
point variation in the percent of minus 200 material passing 
the finest and most critical screen as revealed by indi-
vidual stockpile tests. (Tr. 1440-1442, Ex. 204-D) This is 
further illustrated by comparing a graphic plot of Parson's 
tests with those of two adjoining projects constructed at 
the same time by other contractors where uniformity is 
clearly evident. [Ex. 219-D (Parson), Ex. 220-D & 221-D, 
-11-
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Tr. 1440-1445 for detailed explanation.] Part of this lack 
of uniformity was caused by the manner in which the 
stockpiles were constructedr which resulted in degradation 
and segregation. (Tr. 1108-1111, 1391-1398) Appellant's 
stockpiles were so borderline in their make-up due to lack 
of care by Appellant in their construction that they were 
into the limits of deviation allowed for contract compliance 
without any further breakdown of material normally caused by 
handling in mixing, hauling, placing and partially 
compacting, all of which occurs before compliance testing. 
(Tr. 1306-1309, 1353) Appellant's Fact Statement complains 
of "as much as 50% waste." Wilson's testimony to the 
contrary was that the overall average waste was 35 to 40 
percent. (Tr. 439) Waste amounts as high as 50% are 
normal in District 4 (Southeastern Utah) according to 
Spensko. (Tr. 1520) Contractors experienced in that area 
of the State confirm this. (Tr. 1625, 1635, 1866-1868) The 
previous contractor using Pit 2 experienced 25% waste with 
very careful control. (Tr. 1626-1627) Appellant claims to i 
have expended "elaborate and costly" attempts to achieve 
compliance. (App. - Facts) Unfortunately none of these 
things worked, but Wilson admitted to a number of techniques \ 
that would probably have worked. (Tr. 457-459) UDOT sug-
gested a blend sand, but Appellant's lack of know-how was 
again demonstrated. (Tr. 460-463, 1333-1342, Ex. 208-D). < 
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Appellant's whole crushing operation suffered from lack of 
know-how. For instance, the reject system they designed to 
achieve a better product resulted in rejection of material 
of which 63% would have been in compliance* (Tr. 1322-1329, 
Ex. 205-D) On production days 5, 6, and 7, a mathematical 
analysis of the material put into the plant results in an 
expected product with 12.5% minus 200 which is what actual 
r 
f 
test results revealed, but which is unfortunately well above 
specification limits. (Tr. 1342-1343, Ex. 143-P) Contrary 
to Appellant's assertions this would indicate no breakdown. 
(App. - Facts) Appellant was within compliance on produc-
tion days 4 and 5 but made further adjustments and was again 
out of compliance. (Ex. 38-P) 
Appellant refers to two problems, "excessive waste" and 
"breakdown" of material. (App. - Facts) As pointed out 
above, "waste" was probably normal for the area and "break-
down" was either not occurring or it was being controlled by 
Appellant's efforts. 
Appellant operated a total of 7 days in two weeks 
trying to produce an acceptable paving product. It shut 
down operations on October 20, 1978. 
Appellant's demand for a Supplemental Agreement of 
October 17, 1978 (Ex. 15-P) was not answered in writing 
until February 1, 1979. (Ex. 16-P) Frequent discussion 
occurred during the interim. (Tr. 1343) Respondent's 
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offers and concessions during the Winter of 1978-1979 were 
all attempts at compromise without jeopardy to the public or 
other bidders as explained by Bert Taylor ("Taylor"). (Tr. 
1171-1174, Ex. 105-P, Ex. 22-P) 
One of ODOTfs concessions was to core drill Prospect 2 
to determine its make-up. Appellant refers to the presence 
of 35 feet of overburden as revealed by these cores, but 
fails to mention that they were obtained some 400 feet east 
of the existing face of the pit. (Tr. 1064-1065, Ex. 40-P) 
Appellant's Superintendent knew where the "good material" 
existed before any work commenced since it was then visible. 
He further must have known that it might be necessary to go 
as deep as 36 feet "to obtain better rock." (Tr. 1298f Ex. 
111-P) Appellant's drilling company was apparently 
instructed to drill to this level as well. (Tr. 1301f 
1302[ Testimony and photographic exhibits established that 
material in Pit 2 was deposited in layers and that 
additional layers of material are encountered as removal 
proceeds to the east and that the general trend of all the 
layers is a dip to the northeast which together with the 
added layers accounts for increasing amounts of unknown 
material over the identified harder material as operations 
moved eastward. (Tr. 1080-1081) Photographs in evidence 
show a considerable quantity of large rocky material in 
i 
waste piles which Appellantfs crushing system would not 
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handle. (Tr. 1437, 1438f Exs. 216-D, 217-D) This material 
was not reduced sufficiently by blasting and was apparently 
similar to the material in the north face of Prospect 2. 
(Ex. 124-P) Investigation showed that material with low 
wear test results began at a depth of about 15 feet in Pit 
No. 2 as the face existed after Appellant shut down 
operations in October 1978, and this became the basis of 
Respondent's offer to assist the Appellant by voluntarily 
paying for removal of the top 15 feet of material. (Tr. 
920-924, 1047-1050, 1052, 1154-1156, Exs. 82-P, 114-P, 
185-D) 
Appellant's reference to an inadequate quantity of 
material in Prospect 1 has been earlier referred to as 
erroneous since it was discussed in the preconstruction 
conference. (Exs. 132-D and 133-D) One bidding contractor 
planned to use Prospect 1 for all the material. (Tr. 1580-
l58^) 
Appellant criticizes UDOT for lack of testing in the 
BLM property adjoining Prospect 2 on the North. (App. -
Facts) Spensko explained why it was not necessary. (Tr. 
1080) Taylor concurred in this decision. * Appellant 
further cites delay in its availability. (Ex. 29-P) It 
* UDOT subsequently let a contract to another contractor 
who completed this project in 1981 and 1982 and the 
"BLM" Property was successfully used by that contractor 
to complete the work. 
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is clear that Appellant could have used the "BLM Property" 
if they had so desired prior to formal written permission. 
(Ex. 30-P) Formal permission was received before Appellant 
walked off the job (Ex. 32-P), but Appellant wanted a 
guarantee as to the quality of the material which Respon-
dent refused to provide. (Exs. 31-P, 33-P, Tr. 386) 
Appellant alleges the Respondent refused toflbudge,f and 
grant a Supplemental Agreement. The evidence is to the 
contrary and shows Appellant to be the one who wouldnft 
"budgefw but instead consistently held out for more and more 
concessions. Taylor's testimony clearly illustrates this. 
(Tr. 1150-1193) See also Exhibits 13-P, 15-P, 16-P, 18-P, 
20-P, 21-P, 22-P, 23-P, 25-P, 26-Pf 28-P, 29-P, 30-P, 31-P, 
32-P and 33-P) 
INFORMATION NOT REVIEWED BY APPELLANT 
Appellant alleges undisclosed information in possession 
of UDOT contradicted Sheets 2B and 44. Specifically Appel-
lant alleges undisclosed test data which reveal high wear 
percentages on the L. A. Rattler Tests. UDOT had complete 
records of two previous contracts which utilized Prospect 2 
and additional investigatory tests of the pit and of the 
nearby "west area." (Ex. 77-P) The location of this 
information was disclosed to bidders. (Ex. 3-Pf Spec. 
Provission Sec. 102.05) Wilson and McDonald admitted they 
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knew it existed but chose to ignore it. (Tr. 417, 635-639) 
Pit 2 as viewed by Appellant was located on the north side 
of the highway. Earlier contractors started several hundred 
feet south and moved north and removed an exposed rocky 
material. (Tr. 855,"856f 862, 934, 1458, Ex. 76-P) 
Appellant now refers to isolated test results in a large 
mass of available information which Appellant earlier chose 
to ignore which show L. A. Rattler results with a wear 
percentage greater than 40%. Pit 2 had already demonstrated 
that it can produce specification material. (Ex. 22-P) It 
was established that L.A. Wear test results of the same 
sample of material can vary by as much as 3%. (Tr. 927-930, 
Ex. 81-P, 184-D) It was also shown that since Sheet 2B 
disclosed an L.A. Rattler wear percentage as high as 39%, it 
was reasonable to assume the pit contained material with a 
wear in excess of 40%. (Tr. 1260, 1531, 1599-1601) A high 
wear percentage is considered an advantage since it 
indicates "easy crushing." (Tr. 1591-1593, 1624) It does, 
however, require care in crushing the material. (Tr. 1594-
1596) Spensko explained why Pits 1 and 2 were designated by 
Respondent and that there was no known alternative. (Tr. 
1012-1016) Swapp's report concerning Pit 2, which Appellant 
refers to, was available on request to anyone and Wilson and 
McDonald knew State procedures required its preparation. 
(Ex. 89-P) Sheet 2B and its high L.A. Rattler percentages 
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meant essentially the same as Swapp's comments in his 
report to DDOT to a knowledgeable contractor since W.W. 
Clyde elected to avoid Pit 2 and planned to get all material 
out of Pit 1. (Tr. 1583-1587) Wear factors shown on Sheet 
2B for Pit 1 are not as high as Pit 2. UDOT's 1975 tests 
showing a high quantity of minus 200 material which -
Appellant complains about were taken some 800 to 1000 feet 
west of Appellant's work area and of the location of Test 
1A. (Tr. 1007) The 1975 tests do not indicate that they 
were "crushed ledge rock" as Test 1A does. (Ex. 77-P) Test 
1A, according to McDonald, matches the average of Tests lr 
2, 3 and 4 on Sheet 2B. (Tr. 543) Spensko testified his 
intention was to show information on Sheet 2B which would 
illustrate what the contractor could expect to get from 
material in the exposed rock faces on the north and east. 
The 1969 tests and the one 1978 test are consistent and 
Spensko's decision not to do further testing as required by 
DDOT's materials manual for a new pit is realistic. (Ex. 
92-P, Tr. 1000-1013, 1021-1022) Spensko further explained 
the problem with displaying historical information was in 
part due to a specification change which would affect its 
value. (Tr. 1028-1029) The "good" material was the exposed 
rock ledges which is obvious from photographs. (Tr. 808-
811, Exs. 174-D, 175-D, 177-D) 
Appellant raises concern over a wear test with a result 
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of 46.7% taken from its stockpile by the State and dated 
September 22, 1978. The State employee who performed this 
test explained that he performed it for his own information 
and that no one else was informed of the result since the 
test was not performed according to UDOTfs prescribed pro-
cedure. (Ex. 80-P, 187-D, Tr. 883-901, 936-937) The said 
test result is marked "cleaned with air," and it was 
established that sample! cleaned in this manner show higher 
percentages of breakdown than those performed according to 
prescribed procedures. (As much as 4.5%+) (Tr. 1493-1495, 
Exs. 189-D, 190-D) This information also explains why 
Appellantfs test results conducted by an independent 
laboratory yielded higher percentages than State results on 
comparable material and served to invalidate them insofar as 
comparing results with State test results. (Ex. 16-P, Tr. 
1537-1538) 
-"Appellant refers to Taylor's letter of February 7f 1979 
to FHWA as an admission by UDOT that Sheets 2E and 44 
"incorrectly identified" materials in Prospect 2. (App. 
"C") Taylor explained this conclusion was made before he 
was fully informed. Taylor further explained that UDOT had 
really "not identified" the material in question and that 
the term "incorrectly identified" was really not accurate. 
(Tr. 1173-1174, 1186, 1205-1210, Ex. 101-P) FHWA's letter 
to Taylor commenting on this matter was acknowledged as 
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correct by Taylor and it in essence points out the need for 
further pre-bid investigation by the contractor. (Ex. 102-
P) UDOT had made no effort to analyze the east face of Pit 
2 except for one test (lAf Sheet 2B) since it was not known 
what a contractor might elect to do in Pit 2 or whether Pit 
1 would be selected. UDOT had correctly identified Pit 2 as 
a whole and did not identify any one part of the pit or any 
part not readily capable of visual observation. (Tr. 966-
1000) 
Appellant's reference to Spensko's investigation of Pit 
2 as "sloppy test procedures" (App. - Facts) is hypocritic-
al. This was the third project to use Pit 2. Spensko 
selected an area to testf and the results confirmed previous 
test results of similar formations (Tr. 1029); two con-
tractors had already successfully used Pit 2, and there 
was extensive information available to anyone interested in 
viewing it. Additional tests would have been superfluous. 
Appellant chose to ignore UDOT's invitation to examine other 
available written information and ignored direct verbal 
communication warning of potential difficulties. (Tr. 1467-
1468f Spec. Prov. amending Sec. 102.05 of Standard Spec. -
Ex. 3-P) Appellant's lack of care in its pre-bid examina-
tion is the "sloppy proceduref" if there is one. (Tr. 799-
802) 
Appellantfs claim that Spensko failed to mention that 
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Prospect 2 contained silt stone and sandstone assumes that 
there was a duty to do so. Since this material was easily 
visible and in addition is described in published geologic 
literature, Appellant could easily have acquired that 
knowledge. (Tr. 1090, 1092, 1095-1096, 1720, 1721, Exs. 
191-P and 192-P; 180-D and 195-D) 
Appellant presented two geologists who viewed the site 
after it was blasted and considerable material had been 
removed. (Waggoner & Osborne) Their statements concerning 
"drastic changes in quality in a short distance" and a 
"possible fault" contrast with Respondent's geologist 
witnesses; Swapp who worked the previous contract and who is 
well acquainted with the San Rafael area (Tr. 1455, 1465); 
Al Spensko who has worked in the area for years (Tr. 1092-
1095, Ex. 176-D); and William Lund, who did not view the pit 
but had extensive experience in quarry operations with 
limestone rock. (Tr. 1723-1727) These geologists saw 
little evidence of any "drastic change," or faulting. 
Waggoner was reluctant to admit the obvious presence of a 
well marked and defined layer of rock obvious in two 
different photographs since it contradicted his "drastic 
change in quality" and "possible fault" theory. (Exs. 222-D 
and 231-D, Tr. 1811-1813) There was also some question 
concerning the exact geologic strata Pit 2 was located in. 
Powell (a UDOT geologist in charge of the core drilling) 
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mistakenly labeled the limestone as Kaibab. (Ex. 40-P) 
Spensko identified it as the Sinbad limestone member of the 
Moenkopi (Tr. 1083, 1090, 1092), Swapp confirmed Spenskofs 
conclusion. (Tr. 1465-1466, 1471-1475) A careful analysis 
of all this geologic testimony and documentary evidence 
merely establishes that the same material used by previous 
contractors to successfully construct two previous projects 
existed in the area of the pit that Appellant chose to work 
in but that it was covered by added layers of different 
material which Appellant made no effort to dispose of or 
adequately deal with in its crushing operation. (Tr. 1461-
1464.) These added layers were equally visible to both 
parties. (Tr. 1298-1302, Ex. 111-P) 
Pit 2 contained suitable material but required careful 
quality control in aggregate production. Appellant's manner 
of operation is not the responsibility of Respondent. 
Johnson by contrast was careful and selective in the 
material and methods it used and succeeded where Appellant 
failed. (Tr. 1460-1461, 1464) 
Pit 2 was "acceptable in general" as Respondent states 
in Sheet 44. Appellant is responsible for producing an 
acceptable product if it elects to use said source, and 
Respondent has specifically disclaimed any responsibility 
for Appellant's decisions based on such information. 
Facts in evidence support the specific findings of the 
-22-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
District Court that information supplied was accurate and 
that Appellant's problems were related to its methods of 
production, handling and storing of aggregate material. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO RELY ON PRE-
BID REPRESENTATIONS IS UNREASONABLE BOTH 
LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY. 
A. RESPONDENT'S DISCLAIMER IS VALID 
Appellant asserts that this case is controlled by this 
Court's decision in Thorn Construction Co. Inc. v. UDOT, 598 
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979). Appellant refers to language therein 
quoted and which originates in a leading case on pre-bid 
reliance upon written information which is Souza & McCue 
Construction Co. v. Superior Court of San Benito County, 57 
Cal.2d 508f 20 Cal. Reptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338f 339 (1962), 
The general proposition Appellant relies upon is that: 
A contractor of public works who, acting 
resonablyP is misled by incorrect plans and 
specifications issued by the public authorities 
as the basis for bids and who, as a result submits 
a bid which is lower than he would have otherwise 
madef may recover in a contract action for extra work 
or expenses necessitated by the conditions being 
other than represented..,. (Emphasis added) 
This exact language is quoted by this Court with 
approval in the case of SchOCKer Constr> Co, Yt State Of 
iitalU 619 P.2d 1378 (1980). 
The facts of this case show that Respondent in its 
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solicitation for bids provided certain "minimal information" 
(Ex. 2-P, Sheet 2B and Ex. 3-P, Sheet 44, Tr. 1256-1257) 
regarding two materials prospects often referred to as Pits 
1 & 2. Appellant's Vice President and General Manager Mont 
Wilson selected Pit 2 after a site visit and a brief 
conversation with Respondent's engineer in charge of the 
project, Jerry Mecham. (Tr. 223-232) 
Appellant seeks t6 place the entire responsibility 
for its failure to produce a specification product upon 
Respondent when its choice of Pit 2 was its ownf the 
direction of material removal was its ownf the selection 
of equipment and method of removal of material was its 
own, all without any control or direction of Respondent. 
(Sec. 106.02r Ex. 1-P, Spec. Prov.f Sec. 102.05, Ex. 3-P) 
Respondent's written representations on Sheet 2B 
specifically refer to Section 106.02 of its Standard 
Specifications entitled "Local Material Sources." (Ex. 1-P) 
This provision is referred to as a "disclaimer" and puts a 
contractor on notice that while the materials in a 
"designated source" may be "acceptable in generalf" the 
contractor shall "determine for himself the amount of 
equipment and work required to produce a material meeting 
specifications." It further qualifies sample information 
and warns that variations are both "usual" and "are to be 
expected." 
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